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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the vulnerability of international projects to political risks. A brief review  of
the literature on general risks – natural, financial, cultural and political – is undertaken and  then  a
more detailed review of the literature on political risk is  presented.   It  was  found  that  relatively
few studies of political risk, particularly in the context of international projects, have been  carried
out.   More  particularly  the  focus  has  been   almost   exclusively   on   developed,   rather   than
developing, countries.
Questionnaires were distributed therefore to the entire target population of Jordanian  international
projects. The findings suggest that the political risk associated with international projects  poses  a
threat to the majority of respondents and that the vulnerability to political risk is related to a firm’s
degree of internationalisation. International projects are  more  concerned  about  host-society  and
interstate related risks than host-government related risks.
Keywords:   Political    risk,    managerial    perceptions,    developing    countries,    firm-specific
characteristics.
INTRODUCTION
The aims of this paper are a) to describe and explain the political risks that concern  the  managers
of international projects who are operating within an international business environment and b)  to
explore the correlations between those managerial perceptions of political risks and  various  firm-
specific characteristics.  The specific context is international business projects operating in  Jordan
in 2005.
Despite the fact that political risk studies are “more relevant than ever” [31, p. 2],  there  has  been
relatively  little  effort  made  to  investigate  this  topic,  in  particular   in   developing   countries,
including Jordan.  Political  risk  literature,  consists  of  conceptual  discussion  [25]  and  [8]  and
empirical research which is concerned inter alia, with  identifying  the  managerial  perceptions  of
political risk in different contexts [40], [22], [53], [17], [24]  and  [31].  Most  of  these  theoretical
and empirical studies, however, were carried out in the context of  developed  countries  and  offer
little by way of analysis of the concept in developing countries.
An in-depth  review  of  such  literature  suggests  that  few  studies  have  related  the  managerial
perceptions of risk to firm-specific characteristics. Consequently, the aims of this paper are:  a)  to
describe and  explain  the  political  risks  that  concern  the  managers  of  Jordanian  international
projects while undertaking  international  business  activities  and  b)  to  explore  the  correlations
between the managerial perceptions of political risks and firm-specific characteristics.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Risk Defined
There is, according to Rockett [41], no single accepted or correct definition of risk and there are as
many definitions of risk as there are people  capable  of  defining  it.   Risk,  moreover,  is  usually
misunderstood and used interchangeably with other related  terms  such  as  harm,  hazard,  threat
and uncertainty.
Risk can be seen as a combination of the probability that an event will occur and its consequences.
 Risk may result in losses or gains and may affect all forms in a class or  particular  firms.   If  risk
results in gains (eg taxation), the risk is uninsurable and if risk affects  all  forms  (eg  interest  rate
changes) the risk is undiversifiable.
General Risks in International Business
A review of a wide range of literature on  risk  serves  to  categorise  risks  that  face  international
business and identify  the  specific  components  included  in  each  category.   However,  there  is,
according to Nawaz and Hood [35], no  universally  accepted  typology  for  categorising  risks  in
international business.  A  number  of  such  studies,  as  illustrated  in  Table  1,  have  reported  a
number of different components.  Miller [35] argued that international firms  are  exposed  to  five
types  of  international  risk:  natural,  legal,  societal,  political  and  governmental.   Daniell   [16]
confined such risk to four components: financial, cultural, legal and political.  Similar components
were reported by Hill [23], excluding financial risk.
Political risk in its wider context, contains societal and legal risks.  Therefore, the
classification of general types of risks in international business, as shown in Figure 1, is reduced
to four main types : political, financial, cultural and natural.  The rationale of this division is a
need to examine what general types of risk concern Jordanian international firms.  The division of
risks into four types does not mean that this typology is exhaustive nor are the components of
each category.
Figure 1:  Classification of General Types of Risks in International Business
Political Risk Defined
Throughout the literature there is little consensus on a ‘clear-cut’ definition of  political  risk  [51];
[18].  The  concept  of  political  risk  seems  to  have  plagued  both  academicians  and  corporate
decision-makers due to its nature, as political risk is subjective and  hard  to  quantify  [1].  Wilkin
and Zonis [51] explained that the challenge of identifying political risk lies partly in  the  diversity
of risks covered by the term, which covers a variety of threats, with impacts that vary according to
a firm’s specific exposure. Like Burmester [11], Wilkin and Zonis [51,  p.  6)  continued  that  this
diversity of risks and their effects  mean  that  “operationally  political  risk  carries  very  different
connotations for different firms” and all too often for different people within the same firm.
In business terms, however, the general body of the literature  which  is  concerned  with  political
risk definitions can be divided into two main approaches. The  first  and  most  common  approach
defines political risk in terms of government interference with business operations  [12],  [10]  and
[14]. Butler and Joaquin [12] defined the term as the risk that  a  sovereign  host  government  will
unexpectedly change the ‘rules of the game’ under which a  business  operates.  This  approach  to
defining political risk emphasises governmental action(s), such as  ‘forced  divestment’  as  a  sole
source  of  risk.  This  emphasis  [38],  may  be  far  too  narrow  for  the  complexities  of  modern
international business. Moreover, risk not only contains negative but also positive variations  [24];
[45].
Political risk, as suggested by Brink [8] and Stosberg [44], arises not only from governmental, but
also societal, sources. The second approach, therefore, defines political risk as occurrences of  any
political or societal events imposed upon the international project, as
implied or explicitly stated by Howell [25] and Zarkada-Fraser and Fraser [54]. Howell’s [25, p.4]
definition is representative for this approach who referred the term political risk to  the  possibility
that political decisions or political or societal events in a country will affect  the  business  climate
in such a way that investors will lose money or not make as much money as  they  expected  when
the investment was made. Despite the fact  that  the  second  approach  takes  societal  events  into
account, it is not clear exactly what  risk  elements  are  included  or  excluded.  The  next  section,
therefore, attempts to identify such elements.
Classification of Political Risk
International projects can be harmed  by  a  variety  of  political  and  societal  events  (threats).  In
focusing on political risk, as defined by Howell [25], there is a need  to  identify  and  classify  the
categories of such risk. Examples of political risks under the first approach include: expropriation;
inconvertibility;  import  and/or  export  restrictions;   ownership   and/or   personnel   restrictions;
taxation restrictions, while  political  risks  under  the  second  approach  include:  terrorism,  riots,
coups d’état, war, insurrection, kidnapping. It is  also  useful  to  classify  political  risks  from  the
perspective of political risk insurance agencies since such agencies provide lists of potential losses
to international projects that stem from political and  societal  sources  and  not  commercial  ones.
Typically,   political   risk   insurance,   as   reported   by   Bradford   [8],   covers   assets    against
expropriation, confiscation, contract  repudiation  and  currency  inconvertibility.  Although  many
types of political risk can be insured through private insurers, some losses that stem from  political
sources cannot. Reviewing some main political risk insurers revealed  that  ownership  restrictions
and  taxation,  for  example,  are  not  among  their  lists  of   possible   insured   sources   of   loss.
Furthermore, Howell [25] suggested other types of uninsured losses that  result  from  government
attributes (rather than decisions) like racial quotas in the hiring of personnel.
As has been noted, political risk can be classified as: a) governmental, such as import  restrictions,
or societal such as demonstrations, riots and insurrection; b)  intrastate,  such  as  expropriation  or
interstate,  such  as  war;  c)  insurable  such  as  expropriation  or  uninsurable  such  as   taxation.
Classifying political risks according to one of the aforementioned categories does  not  encompass
all aspects of the risks to international business  that  are  contained  in  its  political  environment.
Furthermore, some events can be classified into two categories such as  expropriation,  which  can
be governmental, and insurable. Political risk, meanwhile, a) should  encompass  all  political  and
societal events that can harm international projects, internal or external,  insurable  or  uninsurable
and favourable or unfavourable [50]; [8]; b) should  not  focus  exclusively  on  the  most  extreme
forms of political risk, such as forced divestment; rather it should include the  more  common,  but
milder risks, such as imposition quotas [38]. Arguably, then, the  best  approach  to  understanding
the  concept  of  political  risk  is  to  classify  such  events  according  to  their   sources.   Such   a
classification, as outlined in Table 1, introduces three main categories of  the  sources  of  political
and societal events: host-government risks, host-society risks  and  interstate  risks.  Applying  the
source of threats approach to classifying political risk has resulted in a mutually  exclusive  list  of
political risks covered by this paper.
These three risk categories will  now  be  discussed  in  more  detail.   The  coverage  of  the  three
categories is not even, due to the differing number of risks in each category.
Table 1: Classification of political risk according to its source
|Source of      |Threats (source of harm)                 |
|threat         |                                         |
|Host           |Expropriation and/or confiscation        |
|government     |Contract repudiation                     |
|               |Currency inconvertibility                |
|               |Ownership and/or personnel restrictions  |
|               |Taxation restrictions                    |
|               |Import and/or export restrictions        |
|Host society   |Terrorism                                |
|               |Demonstrations, riots and insurrection   |
|               |Revolutions, coups d’état and civil wars |
|Interstate     |Wars                                     |
|               |Economic sanctions                       |
Host-Government Risk
Governments,  according  to  Burmester  [11],  are  extremely  influential  actors  in   international
business. A government has a variety of interests and may pursue a  course  of  action  that  affects
the business environment for good or bad.  The  government  of  a  country,  on  the  one  hand,  is
usually keen to encourage the development and growth of commerce and industry [14],  [36].  The
government, as a result, might offer  incentives  to  encourage  new  investment  from  abroad,  for
example by offering tax incentives or cash grants towards the building  of  factories.   To  the  host
government, as explained by Brink [8], international projects can represent an important source of
funds,  technology  and  expertise  that  could  help  further  national  priorities  such   as   regional
development,  employment,  import  substitution  and  export  promotion.  The  government  of   a
country, on the other  hand,  may  also  intervene  in  the  business  environment  for  a  variety  of
reasons. Such resons include: protecting national  industries  from  external  competition;  limiting
foreign exploitation; increasing national welfare; redistributing wealth [2] and [36].
There are six types of such actions a host government can pursue:  taxation  restrictions;  currency
inconvertibility;  contract  repudiation;   import   and/or   export   restrictions;   ownership   and/or
personnel restrictions; expropriation and/or confiscation. and industrial esponage. These  risks  are
called  host-government,   since   they   are   originated   by    host   governments   and   can   have
unfavourable consequences  upon  international  projects  undertaking  any  form  of  international
business activities in a country’s soil. Oetzel [39], nevertheless, argued  that  a  host-government’s
policy priorities are changing, particularly the policies which favour some  industries  over  others.
A firm’s political risk is not only different from firm to firm but also varies over time. By  way  of
illustration, Oetzel  [39]  suggested  that  foreign  firms  operating  in  industries  outside  of  those
targeted by the host country will face significantly  greater  political  risk  in  the  short  term  than
firms operating within industries targeted by the host country.
As has been noted, there are seven types of host-government risks. The first risk is that of taxation
restrictions. Brink [8] suggested that higher  taxes  on  corporate  profits  in  developing  countries
restrict  profit-making.  Taxation  can  also  be  used  either  to  encourage   or   restrict   particular
industries or nationalities. In  the  event  of  imposing  taxation  restrictions,  a  firm’s  expenditure
increases and, as a consequence, its profits decrease. However, as  a  result  of  the  importance  of
foreign  investment  to  a  country’s  economic  growth,  a  government   may   encourage   inward
investment by, inter alia, offering tax incentives [14]  rather  than  imposing  tax  restrictions.  The
importance of foreign investment to a country’s economic growth may, therefore, explain the little
attention paid to taxation  restrictions  by  international  projects,  while  operating  internationally
[40]; [22]; [45] and [17].
The second risk is that of currency inconvertibility. A government, when it  experiences  shortages
of  hard  currencies,  may  take  such  actions.  International  projects,  as  a  consequence,  can  be
negatively affected by such restrictions taken by the government  to  prevent  conversion  of  local
currency to some form of foreign exchange (exchange control) and/or prevent the transforming  of
‘hard’ currency out of the host country (transfer risk). Nonetheless, in  recent  years,  as  suggested
by Hussey [27], there has been a gradual  movement  towards  dismantling  exchange  controls  by
many countries. In Jordan, currency  exchange  control  has  been  liberalised  and  repatriation  of
profits and capital has been authorised. In spite  of  this  gradual  movement  towards  dismantling
exchange controls, Stosberg [44] proposed that some international projects still feel  that  they  are
vulnerable to such risk while operating in developing countries. Empirically, a political risk  study
[24] in the context of UK firms found that most respondents perceived ‘currency or trade controls’
as a potential problem while conducting international business activities.
The  third  risk  is  that  of  contract  repudiation  (sometimes  called   a   breach   of   contract).   A
government may terminate contracts without  compensation  for  existing  investment  for  reasons
related to contract performance.  Since  such  risk  can  have  devastating  impact  upon  firms,  the
breach of contract, according to Moran  [37],  is  considered  as  an  important  risk  of  concern  to
international projects. In this context, firms with large fixed  assets  are  more  vulnerable  to  such
risk and still ‘worry’ about the terms of their operating agreements being changed [31].
The fourth risk is that  of  import  and/or  export  restrictions.  A  government  can  impose  import
restrictions for balance-of-payments reasons, to reduce spending on imports [4],  or  for  industrial
policy reasons; to protect domestic producers of import substitutes [30]. In the event  of  imposing
import restrictions, international projects, inter alia, will not be able to obtain some  material  (e.g.
chemical  substances,  spare  parts,  drugs)  so  this  will  impact  on  their   sales   and   profits.   A
government may also restrict the export of raw  materials  to  encourage  the  growth  of  domestic
processing industries. Nevertheless, export controls can have a negative impact upon  both  a  host
country and international projects  operating  in  the  host  country.  For  the  host  country,  export
restrictions have an immediate adverse effect on a country’s balance  of  trade  while  international
businesses will not be able to export goods which, in turn, affect their profits.  The  adverse  effect
of such restrictions on a country’s balance of trade may explain why international businesses were
not concerned with this risk while operating internationally [40]; [22]; [45].
The fifth risk is that of ownership and/or personnel  restrictions.  These  restrictions  arise  when  a
host  government  demands  that:  a)  government  entities,  or  local  nationals,  own  part   of   the
international projects operating on a country’s soil, and/or  b)  that  local  nationals,  regardless  of
experience, be hired in  such  firms  [8].  This  risk  is  considered  to  be  particularly  problematic
because, such restrictions threaten the ability of the firm to make its  own  strategic  decisions  and
frequently have a direct impact on revenue [30]. International  investors,  according  to  Brink  [8],
may agree upon such actions by host governments in turn for expeditious government approval  of
their operations. Such governmental  interference,  however,  aims  to  increase  the  proportion  of
locals  in  the  management  functions  of  the  international  projects  in  the   host   country.   The
interference,  nevertheless,  can  have   adverse   impact   upon   the   host-government’s   business
environment, which  can  explain  the  little  attention  paid  to  such  risk  in  both  theoretical  and
empirical political risk studies [40], [17]. Other studies [45]  and  [31]  did  not  even  include  this
variable as a risk for international projects.
The sixth risk in the host government category is expropriation and/or confiscation. Expropriation,
according to Howell [25],  is  the  seizure  of  an  investment  by  host  government.  Although  the
International Law recognises the sovereign right of any country to expropriate foreign investment,
this can only be enacted if such an action is lawfully  compensated  [8].  In  an  extreme  situation,
outright nationalisation or confiscation without  compensation  might  occur.  A  government  may
expropriate investments, however,  to  prevent  the  exploitation  of  the  country  by  international
projects [14]. Accordingly, exploitation firms which have  large  fixed  assets  exposure  and  have
more capabilities to exploit a host country, such as oil firms, are more vulnerable to  expropriation
than firms that have minimal asset exposure  [44]  such  as  service  firms.  Indeed,  in  a  study  of
political risk exposure within UK firms, Hood and  Nawaz  [24]  found  that  the  only  respondent
who believed that expropriation was a high risk was from an oil firm.  Wilkin  [50]  proposed  that
‘low’  technology  industries  face  higher  risks  than  ‘high’  technology  industries.  Moran   [37]
explained that ‘high’ technology industries, such as aerospace or electrical are  less  vulnerable  to
expropriation since a host country needs the technology and skills  that  such  firms  provide.  If  a
host government expropriates a high technology industry,  the  government  and  local  firms  will,
inter alia, no longer have access to sophisticated technology.
A review of the cases of expropriation in the context of the Middle East revealed that most  of  the
expropriation cases targeted oil firms. Although such  risk  can  have  a  devastati4g  impact  upon
firms, the negative impact upon a host country is thought to be higher. Therefore, a  host  country,
as suggested by Hood and  Nawaz  [24],  may  not  resort  to  such  seizure  nowadays  due  to  the
unfavourable situation that such an action may create for that country in the long term.  According
to Hood and Nawaz [24] the unfavourable situation could be in the form of international economic
isolation and cessation of support from  the  International  Monetary  Fund  and  the  World  Bank,
which  may  also  mean  an  unfavourable  business  environment  for  that  country.  Despite   this
argument, Burmester  [11]  insisted  that  expropriation  is  still  a  potential  risk  for  international
projects. Minor [36] reiterated  this  proposition  explaining  that  prior  to  the  1980s,  nearly  two
thousands expropriation occurred around  the  globe  and  the  1980s  produced  at  least  as  many
expropriation claims for insurers as the previous decade did.
Host-Society Risk
Despite the risks  posed  by  host  governments  which,  according  to  Burmester  [11],  exemplify
political risk at its extreme; political risk implicates many other actors in the immediate and global
non-market environments of  the  international  business  project.  Political  risk,  as  suggested  by
Brink [8], arises from both political and societal sources. Iankova and Katz  [28]  defined  societal
risk  as  risk  arising  from  political  actions  of  non-governmental  organisations  which   include
revolutions, coups d’état and civil wars. Nevertheless, political risk studies use different  terms  to
refer to such non-governmental risks. For Gurr [20], the  term  political  violence,  also  known  as
‘civil violence’, referred to all disruptive forms of internal  opposition  to  governments,  including
revolutions, terrorism, assassinations, riots and demonstrations. Jeannet and Hennessy [29], on the
other  hand,  used  the  term  social  unrest  which  contains  revolutions,  coups  d’état,  riots   and
demonstrations.
The common theme of these risks is that they are undertaken against  a  constituted  authority  and
can have a negative impact upon international and domestic  investments.  Minor  [36]  and  Brink
[8]  suggested  that  the  impact  of  such  threats  can  be  in  the  form  of  limitations  in  supplies
necessary  for  production,   interrupted   government   services,   damage   to   physical   property,
personnel  loss,  or  even  complete  abandonment  of  the  operation.  Host-society   related   risks,
however, are likely to be of greatest concern to firms operating in developing countries rather than
those firms operating in developed countries; Rice and Mahmoud  [40],  Subramanian  et  al.  [45]
and De Mortanges and Allers [17].
As revealed by both the theoretical and empirical studies previously identified, there  would  seem
to be neither agreement, regarding the definition of, nor the components of, threats  that  can  stem
from, the host society. For this  reason,  and  to  avoid  confusion,  the  different  threats  are  taken
separately for the purpose of this paper. Thus, a host society can introduce the following  risks:  a)
demonstrations,  riots  and  insurrection;  b)  revolutions,  coups  d’état  and   civil   wars;   and   c)
terrorism.
The first category of host-society risks is that of demonstrations, riots and insurrection.  It  can  be
argued that the borderlines between the three risks are not clear,  in  particular  between  riots  and
insurrection.  In  an  attempt  to  differentiate  among  these   terms,   Tareq   [47]   argued   that   a
demonstration can turn into a riot if a  demonstration  results  in  sabotage  and  riot  can  turn  into
insurrection if arms are used. The second  category  is  revolutions,  coups  d’état  and  civil  wars.
Brink [8] and Tareq [47] differentiated between a revolution and a coup d’état in  that  the  former
risk is staged by a larger group and radically changes the political system, while  the  latter  risk  is
usually done by a small group which just replaces the  top  power  ‘figures’.  Brink  [8]  continued
that the leader of a coup is often very close to the centre of power, a member of cabinet, and  often
a minister of defence. Tareq [47] added that the distinction between a civil war and a revolution or
other related terms is arbitrary; a civil war can  also  be  categorised  as  revolution  if  a  civil  war
results in a major societal restructuring. Although civil war poses  threats  to  foreign  investors  in
the form of malicious damage to property, looting or personal threats [8], the  risk  seems  to  have
received little attention in previous risk studies.
The third host-society risk is  terrorism.  Terrorism  is  a  term  with  no  agreed  definition  among
governments or academic analysts,  but  is  ‘almost’  invariably  used  in  a  pejorative  sense  [13].
According to Czinkota et al. [15], the central meaning  of  terrorism  is  the  use  of  terror  for  the
furthering of political ends. Halliday [21] added that the range of activities which the  term  covers
has been wide, but four main  forms  of  actions  tend  to  be  included:  assassinations;  bombings;
seizure  of  individuals  as  hostages;  hijacking  of  planes.  Czinkota  et  al.  [15]   explained   that
terrorism  poses  threats  to  the  operations  of  the  firm,  including:  declines  in  buyer   demand;
interruptions in value and supply  chains;  new  policies,  regulations  and  laws  and  deteriorating
international relations that affect trade.
In recent times, terrorism  is  receiving  increased  attention  in  risk  studies  [15];  [9].  Hood  and
Nawaz [24] added that recent developments in terrorism are bringing a new dimension to  political
risk; while terrorism in the past may have been identified as a country  risk,  the  21st  century  has
seen the growth of terrorist groups who are not associated with a specific country or  geographical
region. As a consequence, the action of such groups, as  argued  by  Hood  and  Nawaz  [24],  may
disrupt a business across a range of activities and locations, rather than disrupting operations  in  a
specific country. Furthermore, current trends in terrorism, as suggested by Brodsky [9] indicate an
increasing desire and ability to cause  mass  destruction.  Brodsky  [9]  explained  that  about  81.0
percent of all  suicide-bomb  attacks  since  1968  have  occurred  after  11th  of  September.  As  a
consequence, firms, as players in such environments, are in a period of heightened risk.
Terrorism is increasingly associated with religious affiliation – most  prominently  in  the  case  of
Islamic  terrorism.   However,  religious  motivation  may  lead  to  other  cultural  and/or  societal
changes or pressures for change which may pose significant risks  for  international  projects.   For
instance, pressure for the introduction of Islamic Sharia Law in countries  or  regions  of  countries
such as northern Nigeria may increase  the  risk  associated  with  operating  in  such  geographical
areas by changing the terms and conditions associated with, for example, the  charging  of  interest
for commercial loans.
Interstate Risk
The discussion to this point has  concentrated  mainly  on  risks  identified  within  the  context  of
national analysis. However, the international society of countries, as suggested by Burmester [11],
is as liable to experience conflict and change as any other society, and the effects  on  international
projects may be profound. Similarly, Brink [8] suggested that international projects are exposed to
risks occurring within and among countries. This  suggestion  indicates  that  political  risk  places
some  emphasis  on  interstate  (as  opposed  to  intrastate)  political  conflict,  such  as   wars   and
economic sanctions. In the event of war, a firm can be exposed to  non-payment,  loss  of  income,
business interruption, loss of equity investments, or damage to physical assets.
Sanctions usually take the form of restrictions on imports or exports, or on  financial  transactions.
In the event of sanctions, as suggested by Burmester [11], the target country is exposed to  loss  of
external trade (import and/or  export)  and  less  foreign  investment  inflows.  Sanctions  can  also
disrupt the local industry,  in  particular  if  the  industry  relies  on  foreign  material.  Despite  the
importance of  this  risk,  there  would  seem  to  be,  however,  little  attention  paid  to  economic
sanctions in previous risk studies, primarily due to the fact that such studies  were  mostly  written
within the context of developed countries.
Managerial perceptions of Risk
Risk is a combination of the probability of an event occurring and  its  consequences.  Sarewitz  et
al.  [42]  distinguished  between  two  components  of  risk,  which  they  called  ‘event  risk’   and
‘outcome risk’: event risk is the occurrence of any particular event, say war, whereas outcome risk
is a particular outcome, say GB £ one million in losses, from a particular war. Outcome  risk  (and
not event risk), according to Sarewitz et al. [42], integrates  both  the  characteristics  of  a  subject
and the chance of the occurrence of an event that, jointly, result in losses.
The in-depth reviews of political risk literature [32] and [19] emphasise that the impact of political
risk is via firm-specific characteristics. This emphasis was also reported  by  most  recent  political
risk studies, including [51], [31] and [39]. In addition, Kobrin [32] and  Fitzpatrick  [19]  were  the
first researchers to make the now common division of political risk into ‘macro’ risks and  ‘micro’
risks. Macro-risk occurs when risks affect all foreign  firms  (e.g.  revolutions,  coups  d’état,  civil
wars) while ‘micro’ risk occurs when risks are intended to  affect  only  selected  business  activity
(e.g. import or currency controls directed at specific industries).
In  identifying  the  ‘perceptions’  of  such  outcome  risk,   Millstein   and   Halpern-Felsher   [34]
suggested identifying the degree of concern an  individual  has  about  a  particular  outcome  (e.g.
how concerned are you about the impact of war?),  which  is  also  referred  to  as  ‘perceptions  of
vulnerability’ or ‘feelings’. The term vulnerability, however,  cannot  be  divorced  from  the  term
risk with regard to the different views of definitions in the  academic  literature  [42].  One  of  the
easiest, and at the same time comprehensive, definitions of vulnerability, as suggested by  Bogardi
[6], is the likelihood of injury, death, loss,  disruption  of  livelihood  or  other  harm  in  an  event.
Millstein and Halpern-Felsher [34] further classified such perceptions into conditional versus non-
conditional.  Conditional  perception  of  vulnerability  is  one  in  which  explicit  mention  of   an
antecedent condition such as a situation or behaviour is made (e.g. when undertaking international
business activities, how concerned are you about the impact of war?). In contrast,  non-conditional
perception of vulnerability is one in which no explicit mention of an antecedent condition, such as
a situation or behaviour, is made.
Although measuring the perceptions  of  vulnerability  has  something  to  say  about  respondents’
sense of risk, the outcome of such measurement is subject to three drawbacks. Firstly, there would
seem to be, according to Bogardi [6], p.  363),  no  “agreed  indicators  to  measure  the  individual
components of vulnerability” nor “agreement upon  methodology;  how  to  collect  the  subjective
information on vulnerability”. Brink [8] reiterated this point, arguing that in political  risk,  “terms
such as likelihood, chances and probability are judgements rather than mathematical calculations”.
Secondly, perceptions of vulnerability are influenced by the potential cost  of  events  should  they
arise [5]; [32]; [52]. The cost of an event, in turn, depends on the extent  of  assets  exposure  [39],
the value of the particular market [32] and the like. Thirdly, the vulnerability of a firm to  political
risk,  as  proposed  by  Burmester  [11]  and  Wilkin  [50],  depends  on  the  size  of  facility   (e.g.
subsidiary,  affiliate,  branch),  the   degree   of   international   competition   and   the   technology
implicated in the investment. By way of illustration, Wilkin  [50]  proposed  that  ‘wholly  owned’
projects are more than three times more at risk for expropriation than minority joint  ventures.  For
this paper, variables of cost and the type and size of facility have not been taken into account since
the firms in the sample were required to rate the vulnerability to  the  impact  of  political  risks  in
different countries rather than on a country-to-country basis. It follows, therefore, that,  examining
the impact of such  variables  on  the  vulnerability  to  political  risk,  inevitably,  requires  precise
assessment not only on a country-to-country basis but also on an event-to-event and a firm-to-firm
basis. This is because the vulnerability to the impact of political risk is not only a firm-specific but
also country-specific [33].
For the aforementioned reasons, and to avoid confusion, throughout this paper managerial concern
is referred to as the degree of concerns managers have about risks in terms  of  their  unfavourable
consequences  upon  managers’  firms.  Measuring  risk  with  regard  to  its  impact,  however,   is
consistent with most political risk  empirical  studies,  including  Kobrin  [32],  [40],  Hashmi  and
Guvenli [22], Subramanian et al. [45], De Mortanges and Allers [17] and Oetzel [39].
METHODOLOGY
Since the 1970s, an increasing number of Jordanian firms have become  involved  in  international
business. Many of these firms would not survive without such an involvement. Nevertheless, as  a
consequence of the internationalisation, firms are exposed to a wide range of  risk  [38],  of  which
political risk is the most  threatening  [39];  [48];  [49].  For  Jordanian  international  projects,  the
exposure to political risk is intensified since they are operating in a politically volatile  region:  the
Middle East.
In line with the paper objectives, a survey strategy was selected. Primary and secondary data were
also used. Self-administered questionnaires (see Appendix) were distributed between  January  and
April 2005 to the entire target population of Jordanian international projects.  This consisted of 79
firms registered on the Amman stock exchange.  All of  the  projects  were  of  the  private-private
variety.  In order to obtain a more homogenous sample of these firms, only the headquarters  were
included, eliminating subsidiaries, divisions and plants. Each questionnaire was accompanied by a
covering letter asking that the questionnaire be filled in  by  general  managers  themselves  unless
there were particular personnel responsible for political risk.
Forty-four out of  seventy-six  questionnaires  (the  entire  target  population)  were  returned.  The
response rate, 57.8 %, is ‘high’ and ‘adequate’  to  carry  out  the  data  analysis,  as  suggested  by
Saunders et al. [43, p. 284]. Such an adequate response rate is also  an  indication  of  management
interest in the topic.
The firm-specific characteristics examined included: a) the total assets in US $ million as proxy to
a firm’s size; b) the number of years in international business, the percentage of revenue generated
by international business activities and the  number  of  countries  in  which  the  firm  operates  as
proxies to a firm’s degree of internationalisation; c) a firm’s type of industry  (industrial,  banking,
service); d) a firm’s  ownership  (governmental,  private).  The  latter  characteristic  has  not  been
taken into account in any of the political risk research.
The outputs of a Normal Quantiles-Quantiles chart (Q-Q chart plots) test of many of  the  research
variables indicated that the  distribution  in  question  was  significantly  different  from  a  normal
distribution (i.e.  the  distribution  is  non-normal).  Consequently,  non-parametric  statistics  were
used to analyse the data obtained. To test whether the sample was  representative  and  not  biased,
the  Chi-square  test  was  used.  The  output  of  Chi-square  statistics   indicated   no   statistically
significant difference between respondents and non-respondents with respect to industry  category
(X² = 2.552, p = 0.279, 2-sided) and a firm’s total assets (X²  =  5.583,  p  =  0.061,  2-sided).  The
sample, thus, is representative of the population and the findings can be  generalised  to  the  entire
population.
RESULTS
Respondents to the questionnaires were presented with a list of the four  literature-derived  general
risks of the international business environment and requested to rate their concerns about each risk
on a five-point rating scale, in  which  1  stood  for  ‘not  concerned’  and  5  stood  for  ‘extremely
concerned’. Based on the means of risk scores, as shown in Table 2, respondents  were  concerned
about  political  risk  first  (mean  4.05),  financial  risk  second  (mean  3.79),  cultural  risk   third
(mean 3.12) and natural risk  last  (mean  2.21).  This  finding   corroborates  the  views  of  earlier
writers [11],  [31],  [8]  and  [44]  who  argued  that  political  risk  is  one  of  the  most  important
categories of risk for international projects.
Table 2: Relative importance of general risks by mean
|General risks |Importance                                              |
|              |Mean    |SD      |% a     |Valid N |Level of Importance|
|Political     |4.05    |1.03    |76.1    |42      |Most important     |
|Financial     |3.79    |0.83    |62.7    |43      |                   |
|Cultural      |3.12    |1.13    |40.4    |42      |                   |
|Natural       |2.21    |1.15    |16.2    |43      |Least important    |
a: The percentage of respondents who scored 4 ‘very concerned’ and 5 ‘extremely concerned’.
In line with the international business literature,  Jordanian  international  projects  have  expanded
into environments that are culturally and geographically closest to the home country; 75.3  percent
of  countries  where  Jordanian  international  projects  operate  are  within  the  Middle  East.  The
conduct of international business activities in such a politically  volatile  region  suggests  that  the
risk of first most concern to respondents is likely to be that of political risk. In spite of the fact that
all  business  is  exposed  to  risk,  some  characteristics  of  firms  can  make  them  more  or   less
vulnerable to the impact of risk in the event of its occurrence.  Calculating  means  for  managerial
perceptions of political risk (mean is derived from a  five-point  rating  scale,  where  1  stands  for
‘not concerned’ and 5 stands for ‘extremely concerned’) revealed that high-internationalised firms
in terms of the number of operating countries (those which  operate  in  ?  11  countries)  are  more
concerned about the impact of political risk than are medium-internationalised (those operating  in
6-10 countries) or low-internationalised firms (those operating in ? 5 countries) (mean 4.36 versus
4.00 and 3.85, respectively). This finding supports the views  of  Howell  [25]  and  Stosberg  [45]
who suggested that the more widespread the international involvement, the stronger  the  potential
impact of the political risk.
Respondents to the questionnaires  were  also  presented  with  a  list  of  eleven  literature-derived
political risks and requested to rate their degrees of concern on a five-point rating scale,  in  which
1 stood for ‘not concerned’ and 5 stood for ‘extremely concerned’.  Based  on  the  means  of  risk
scores, as presented in Table 3, the political risks that concern  respondents,  in  descending  order,
were: demonstrations, riots and insurrection (mean 4.35); wars (mean  4.23);  economic  sanctions
(mean 3.98); revolutions, coup d’état and civil wars (mean 3.55); terrorism (mean  2.98);  taxation
restrictions (mean 2.98); currency inconvertibility (mean 2.95); contract repudiation  (mean  2.74);
import   and/or   export   restrictions   (mean   2.72);   ownership   and/or    personnel    restrictions
(mean 2.60); expropriation (mean 2.37).
Table 3: Relative importance of political risks by mean
|Political risks                    |Mean a|SD    |% b   |Valid |
|                                   |      |      |      |N     |
|Demonstrations, riots and          |4.35  |0.72  |86.0  |43    |
|insurrection                       |      |      |      |      |
|Wars                               |4.23  |0.95  |86.0  |43    |
|Economic sanctions                 |3.98  |1.24  |78.5  |42    |
|Revolutions, coups d’état and civil|3.55  |1.11  |61.9  |42    |
|wars                               |      |      |      |      |
|Terrorism                          |2.98  |1.26  |34.8  |43    |
|Taxation restrictions              |2.98  |1.14  |37.2  |43    |
|Currency inconvertibility c        |2.95  |1.11  |32.5  |43    |
|Contract repudiation d             |2.74  |1.20  |27.9  |43    |
|Import and/or export restrictions e|2.72  |1.44  |41.8  |43    |
|Ownership and/or personnel         |2.60  |1.15  |23.8  |42    |
|restrictions                       |      |      |      |      |
|Expropriation and/or confiscation  |2.37  |1.09  |16.2  |43    |
b: Mean is derived from a five-point rating scale,  where  1  stands  for  ‘not  concerned’  and  5  stands  for
‘extremely concerned’.
c: The percentage of respondents who scored 4 ‘very concerned’ and 5 ‘extremely concerned’.
d: There are significant positive correlations between the degree of concern as to  currency  inconvertibility
risk with each of a firm’s total assets in US $ million (Spearman’s Rho = 0.413, p <  0.01,  2-tailed)  and
the number of countries of which a firm has facilities (Spearman’s Rho = 0.316, p < 0.05, 2-tailed).
e: There is a significant positive correlation between a firm’s total assets and  the  vulnerability  to  contract
repudiation risk (Spearman’s Rho = 0.460, p < 0.01, 2-tailed).
f: The vulnerability  to  import  and/or  export  risk  is  significantly  related  to  a  firm’s  type  of  industry
(Cramer’s V = 0.530, p < 0.01).
Host-government risks received the lowest concern rating  among  all  the  political  risk  types  by
Jordanian respondents. This finding is in line with the view suggested by  Nawaz  and  Hood  [38]
who believed  that  the  role  of  governments  in  regulating  businesses  has  decreased.  The  low
concerns relating to such risks can  be  attributed  to  the  fact  that  the  government  of  a  country
certainly wants to encourage the development and growth of commerce and industry and so might
offer incentives to encourage new investment from abroad  rather  than  impose  restrictions.  This
finding has four implications.
Firstly, some traditional sources of political risk, such as  expropriation  and  taxation  restrictions,
are diminishing. This result is in line with the finding of Hood and Nawaz [24]  in  the  context  of
UK firms. Consequently, a political risk in the past does not necessarily  mean  a  political  risk  in
the future and the view that political risk  is  much  more  than  the  obvious  expropriation  risk  is
reinforced. Secondly, if the probability of a political  risk  occurring  is  low  but  its  unfavourable
consequence is high, the managerial concern of such risk can be  low  as  well.  Consequently,  the
most  drastic  political  event,  i.e.  expropriation  is  not  necessarily  the  most  frequent  or   most
threatened.  Thirdly,  host-government  policy  priorities,  particularly  those  which  favour   some
industries over others, change; so a firm’s host-government risk can change as well. Thus, a firm’s
host-government related risks not only can be different  from  industry  to  industry  but  also  vary
over time. Fourthly, a host-country government can have  an  important  role  in  minimising  risks
that can face international projects operating on its soil.
In this paper, the vulnerability to the impact of three host-government related risks is found  to  be
related to firm-specific characteristics. Firstly, firms operating in a  number  of  countries  need  to
make  a  series  of  financial  transactions  between  the  home  country  and  host  country(s)  and,
therefore, are particularly concerned about the risk of currency  inconvertibility  (Spearman’s  Rho
=  0.316  p  <  0.05,  2-tailed).  Secondly,  firms  with  larger  total  assets  are  significantly   more
concerned  about  the  breach,  or  unilateral  revision,  of  the  investment  by  a  host  government
(Spearman’s Rho = 0.460, p  <  0.01,  2-tailed).  Thirdly,  industrial  firms  are  significantly  more
concerned about import and/or export restrictions than banks or service firms  (X²  =  12.071,  p  <
0.01; Cramer’s V = 0.530, p < 0.01), mainly because  industrial  firms  are  those  concerned  with
importing and/or exporting goods.
Respondents, however, are more concerned about the political risk which arises from host  society
than those which arises from the direct actions of a  host  government.  Demonstrations,  riots  and
insurrection are the risks of first and most concern to respondents, followed by revolutions,  coups
d’état  and  civil  wars.  These  risks  are  commonplace  events  in   the   Middle   East   and   their
consequences, in the event of their occurrence, are at the country level and expected to  be  severe.
Nevertheless, terrorist activities are also commonplace events in the  Middle  East,  yet  they  have
received the least concern rating among all the host-society related risks.
This finding, however, contradicts the general theme of other  political  risk  studies  which  called
this era the age of terrorism [26] and a period of terrorism risk [15]; [9]. This can  be  attributed  to
the fact that those studies  which  addressed  terrorism  as  an  important  variable  in  international
business were mainly USA and/or European. In the context of the Middle East, it is suggested that
mainly ‘western’ targets are vulnerable to such risk [3]. Kettis [31, p. 116]  further  explained  that
one source of such a political risk is Al-Qaeda, which works as a decentralised  network  governed
by common values and is characterised by “aggressiveness  and  very  low  risk  aversion  and  has
global reach”. Kettis [31] added that Al-Qaeda’s values and  objectives  are  not  only  in  extreme
contrast with those values and objectives of the ‘western world’, but  also  in  opposition  to  them.
Minor [36] suggested that the Iraq war will trigger increased anti-USA sentiment;  intensifying  an
upsurge in terrorist acts on US interests.
Czinkota  et  al.  [15]  found  that  tourism  related  services  (hotels,  travel   agents,   restaurants),
meanwhile, tend to be particularly affected by terrorism. A review of  some  of  the  main  terrorist
acts in the Middle East in the  year  2005  revealed  that,  excluding  those  acts  in  Iraq,  they  had
targeted tourists. Furthermore, in the context of the Middle  East,  including  Jordan,  terrorist  acts
seem to target  tourism  related  services  and  particular  nationalities.  It  is  appropriate,  then,  to
conclude that what political risk is to one particular nationality does not have to be a political  risk
to another.
In the context of interstate risks, wars are  the  risk  of  second  most  concern  to  respondents  and
economic sanctions are the risk of third most concern among all the political risk types.  The  high
degree of managerial concern about interstate risks can be attributed to the fact that these risks  are
commonplace events in  the  Middle  East.  The  degree  of  concern  about  interstate  risks  is  not
significantly related to any firm-specific characteristics, suggesting  that  these  risks  are  ‘macro’.
This finding implies that managerial perceptions of political risk in  developing  countries  can  be
different from those in developed countries.
CONCLUSION
The findings of this research suggest that the political risk  associated  with  international  projects
poses a threat to the majority of companies and that the vulnerability to political risk is related to a
firm’s degree of internationalisation.  International projects are more concerned about host society
and interstate related risks than host government related risks.
Although  this  paper  has  contributed  to  the  understanding  of  the  managerial   perceptions   of
political risk in both developed and developing countries, it  has  also  created  a  need  for  further
research. There is a need, in particular, not only to describe but also to understand  the  managerial
perceptions of political risk within  the  firm-specific  characteristics  framework.  Future  research
might use a multi-method of data collection since validity is  raised  as  a  quality  data  issue  with
regard to the use of quantitative methods.
As firms are become international they are exposed to  new  risks,  of  which  political  risk  is  the
most obvious. Although political risk can be categorised precisely,  the  division  of  political  risk
into three main categories does not imply that this typology is exhaustive nor are  the  components
of each category. Political risk, however, varies across firms, varies across countries  and  changes
over time. It is, thus, practically hard to achieve a general understanding  of  political  risk  and  its
impacts on firms. Therefore,  the  view  that  political  risk  should  be  considered  within  a  firm-
specific characteristics framework is reinforced.
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